In 2009 and 2010, China undertook a 4 trillion Yuan fiscal stimulus, roughly equivalent to 12 percent of annual GDP. The "fiscal" stimulus was largely financed by off-balance sheet companies (local financing vehicles) that borrowed and spent on behalf of local governments. The off-balance sheet financial institutions continued to grow after the stimulus program ended at the end of 2010. After the end of the stimulus program, spending by these off-balance sheet companies accounted for roughly 10% of GDP each year, with an increasing share used for what are essentially private commercial projects. The off-balance spending by local governments is likely responsible for a 5 percentage-point increase in the aggregate investment rate and part of the 7 to 8 percentage-point decline in current account surplus since 2008. Finally, we argue that local governments used their new access to financial resources to facilitate access to capital to favored private firms, which potentially worsens the overall efficiency of capital allocation. The long run effect of off-balance sheet spending by local governments may be a permanent decline in the growth rate of aggregate productivity and GDP.
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Introduction
In November 2008, in the depths of the world financial crisis, China announced to great fanfare a 4 trillion Yuan fiscal stimulus to be spent by 2010. Dominique Strauss-Kahn, then the managing director of the International Monetary Fund, said in response to the announcement of the stimulus plan that "it will have an influence not only on the world economy in supporting demand but also a lot of influence on the Chinese economy itself, and I think it is good news for correcting imbalances."
1 These funds, amounting to about 12 percent of annual Chinese GDP, were mostly to be spent on infrastructure projects in 2009 and 2010.
Many people viewed the fiscal stimulus as playing an important role in preventing the world recession from getting worse. Paul Krugman wrote in 2010 that China had engaged in "much more aggressive stimulus than any Western nation -and it has worked out well."
2
The goal of this paper is two-fold. First, we analyze the institutional details on how the fiscal stimulus was financed. We show that the fiscal stimulus was implemented by local governments and mostly financed by the relaxation of financial constraints facing local governments. Specifically, local governments were legally prohibited from borrowing or running deficits. To circumvent these legal restrictions, local governments were allowed to create off-balance sheet companies known as local financial vehicles in 2009 and 2010 to fund the stimulus spending. A typical arrangement would be that local governments would transfer ownership of land to the local financing vehicle, and the land would be used as collateral to borrow from banks and shadow banks (trust products) as well as to issue bonds. Figure 1 plots the investment rate and the budget deficit with vertical lines drawn at the beginning and end of the stimulus. As can be seen, the investment rate increased by about 4 percent of GDP in 2009 and 2010, suggesting that much of the fiscal stimulus was spent on public infrastructure projects as planned. However, it can also be seen there was much smaller increase in the (official) budget deficit of the Chinese government. 3 We show that the gap between the increase in the investment rate and the budget deficit was bridged by off-balance sheet spending via the new local financing vehicles.
Second, we assess the consequences of this financing choice after the end of the stimulus program in 2010. We argue that throughout this period local governments were actively providing "special deals" to favored private business, but could not borrow or influence the lending decisions of state owned banks. The effect was that the assistance 2 provided by local governments to favored private firms largely consisted of exemptions to a thicket of rules and regulations, but they could not provide preferential access to capital to the private firms they were trying to assist. These two institutional features --high powered incentives to provide special deals along with restrictions on access to capital --explain how
China was able to grow rapidly despite seemingly low quality institutions.
We show the off-balance sheet financial institutions created to fund the fiscal stimulus changed the nature of the special deals regime. Specifically, we show the off-balance sheet financial institutions continued to grow even after the stimulus program was over, as local governments found themselves with powerful new tool to provide support for favored private firms. As partial evidence, Figure 1 shows that the investment rate remained higher (compared In short, the fiscal stimulus was really partial financial liberalization. It is partial because financial constraints were lifted only for local governments, and not for private financial institutions or for state owned banks. This might have had positive effects on welfare and growth if local governments used these resources for high social return projects previously starved of resources. However, we provide evidence that in addition to funding infrastructure projects, the relaxation of financial constraints also made it possible for local governments to channel financial resources towards commercial projects favoring certain private firms. In 2014 and 2015 we estimate that the off-balance sheet spending by local governments accounted for about 11% of GDP, with 2.4% of GDP spent on local infrastructure projects and 8.6% of GDP on what are essentially private commercial projects. The aggregate effect is that the overall efficiency in the allocation of capital worsened which, ceteris paribus, lowers the aggregate growth rate.
The net effect is that despite the increase in the investment rate after 2008, aggregate growth rates have declined significantly (Figure 2 ). There are clearly many other forces behind the slowdown in Chinese growth, and we do not attempt to parse these out in this paper, but the long shadow of the Chinese fiscal stimulus driven by the behavior of local governments is likely an important force. Moreover, we document that despite numerous attempts by the Chinese Central Government to roll back the off-balance borrowing by the local financing vehicles, it has so far proven to be very difficult to do so. We conclude that if changes are not 3 made, this does not augur well for future Chinese growth, with potentially large spillover effects on growth in other regions of the world.
The paper proceeds as follows. We first describe the key institutional features behind China's growth in the two decades prior to the fiscal stimulus. We then lay out the key facts about the fiscal stimulus, before describing the growth of the off-balance sheet financial institution. We then use data from a sample of these off-balance sheet financial institutions as well as firm level data from the Chinese industrial survey to provide micro-economic evidence on the effect of the institutions created by the fiscal stimulus. (Bai, Hsieh, and Song, 2016) , we argue that the key to China's growth is the development of an informal regime of "special deals" combined with strict financial constraints over local governments. We argue that a sine qua non of successful private firms in China is that they need to have the political support of a local Communist Party boss. This is because, as suggested by the World Bank's Doing Business indicators, formal institutions for private firms are very bad in China. In this environment, the only way for a private firm to succeed is that they manage to enter into a relationship with a political leader that allows them to circumvent the formal rules. This is common in countries with weak formal institutions and we argue that China is no different.
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Growth under Special Deals and Financial Constraints
Yet the outcome, in terms of the growth of private firm and aggregate growth more generally, appears to be different in China compared to other countries with seemingly similar regimes. Why is China different? For the purposes of this paper, a key feature of the Chinese system is that local governments (at the level of counties and prefectures) have enormous 5 power, and have largely used this power in the last 20 years to support a subset of private firms, but they did not have access to financial resources. This was important in forcing local governments to support favored private firms by improving the institutional environment facing the favored firms. Their support for private firms primarily took the form of exemption to official rules and lobbying the central government for special exemptions to the rules for their favored private firms. They could not provide financial support to favored private firms.
The severe budget constraints also meant that there was little that could be directly stolen from the public budget.
There were three key institutional reforms in the 1990s that created the severe budget constraints faced by local governments. In the early 1990s, taxes were largely under the control of local governments. In 1994 for example, almost 80 percent of all tax revenues were collected and spent by local governments (see Figure 3 ). Under this system, known as the "fiscal contract responsibility system," local governments had to make fixed or regressive payments to the central government but could keep the remainder of local taxes.
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The "tax sharing reform" in 1994 removed control of local governments over the allocation of local tax revenues. As can be seen in Figure 3 , the tax share of local governments fell from about 80 percent to 40 to 50 percent in 1994. The central government made fiscal transfers to local governments but tied these transfers to specific spending projects, at least for wealthier local governments. For wealthier localities, more than 80 percent of the transfers from the central government were earmarked for specific projects, particularly social security and welfare programs. Specifically, almost 80 percent of all fiscal transfers were designated for specific projects or transfers from wealthier to poorer localities.
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To be sure, local governments responded by looking for other sources of revenues.
Many local governments began to impose penalties for legal violations and fees for access to "public" services. The consequence of the "three-eyed" system was that local officials exercised their political influence over the banks by allocating loans towards their pet projects. In 1997 and 1998, using the Asian financial crisis was an excuse, the central government pushed through a new "vertical management system" for the state banks. Specifically, the provincial branches of the state owned banks were dismantled and replaced with nine branches that crossed several provinces. Importantly, the power of local Communist Party officials over the appointments of local bank officers was removed and centralized by the People's Bank of China. This power was further centralized in 2003 when the China's Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) was established.
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As a result, the banking sector became more competitive (see Hachem and Song, 2016 and the "no-stimulus" counterfactual.
The second and third columns in Table 1 present the on-budget public spending due to the fiscal stimulus under this counterfactual. The second column presents the estimated spending of the consolidated government (local and central) and the third column presents 11 These numbers are from Feng et. al.'s (2015) tabulations from the Urban Household Survey. 12 On the monetary policy side, the required reserve ratios was adjusted downwards by three times in the fourth quarter of 2008, down from 17.5% to 16% and from 16.5% to 13.5% for large and small financial institutions, respectively. The official benchmark interest rates were cut by four times in that period. The one-year deposit and loan rates, for instance, dropped from 4.14% and 7.2% to 2.25% and 5.31%, respectively.
spending of local governments "due" to the fiscal stimulus. From comparing the second and third columns, it can be seen that the additional spending due to the fiscal stimulus was mostly local government spending -there was very little additional spending by the central government. Furthermore, the magnitude of the on-budget spending is much smaller than the projected spending. The additional on-budget spending we attribute to the fiscal stimulus is only slightly more than one trillion Yuan, which is 3 trillion Yuan short of the projected spending under the stimulus plan. The discrepancy between the planned spending and onbudget spending is largest for "railway, roads, airports, water conservancy, and urban power grids" (1.5 trillion vs. 0.27 trillion) and "post-disaster reconstruction" (the Wenchuan earthquake).
Another way to see the discrepancy between the planned spending and the actual "onbudget" spending that took place is to look at the budget deficit. While this evidence may suggest that the fiscal stimulus may not have been fully implemented, the evidence on aggregate investment from the national accounts indicates otherwise. The justification for looking at aggregate investment is that about 72 percent of the projected stimulus spending in Table 1 
Financial Deregulation
In the previous section, we showed that the 4 billion Yuan stimulus only generated a 1 billion Yuan increase in spending that appeared on the balance sheet of the public sector in 2009 and 2010. Yet the evidence from the national accounts suggests that much more than 1 trillion Yuan was spent. Since only a quarter of the spending was on the balance sheet of local governments, the remaining three-quarter must have been undertaken by entities that were off the balance sheet of local governments. In this section, we document the institutional changes that facilitated the growth of the off-balance sheet institutions. In addition, we discuss the limited data available on the quantitative importance of this off-balance sheet spending.
As we described earlier, local governments were prohibited from running budget deficits. However, the decision in November 2008 was that local governments would be in charge of the stimulus spending. How could this be done if the 1995 budget law and numerous regulations made it illegal for local governments to borrow? One possibility was for the central government to borrow on behalf of local governments and transfer the necessary funds to local governments, but this would obviously increase the central government's debt.
Furthermore, any spending plan of the central government had to be approved by the National People's Congress. Instead, the decision was to circumvent the 1994 budget law by allowing local governments to use off-balance sheet companies known as local financing vehicles. In this way, the debt would not show up on the balance sheet of the central government, and there would be no technical violation of the 1994 budget law.
In March 2009, the CBRC made this decision public (although the rules had already been informally relaxed before the public announcement): The last regulatory change worth emphasizing is that local government were encouraged to borrow from financial institutions, which was not allowed by the Budget Law and many regulations issued before 2008. Although the new regulation says explicitly that external financing should only be used for investment projects set up by central government, the loophole is that the new regulation does not apply to local financing vehicles. By using these off balance sheet institutions, local government can raise funds without violating the Budget Law.
"Encourage local governments to attract and to incentivize banking and financial institutions to increase their lending to the investment projects set up by the central government. This can be done by a variety of ways including increasing local fiscal subsidy to interest payment, improving rewarding mechanism for loans and establishing government
There are two sources of publicly available information on the activities of these off balance sheet companies. First, local financing vehicles that issue bonds have to provide annual financial statements. LFVs that do not issue bonds do not have to provide such information.
These financial statements are compiled by a company called WIND. 15 In addition to the identity of each LFV, the key data we use from the financial statements is the total debt of each LFV. There is, however, no information on the composition of the liabilities or assets of the LFVs.
A second source of information is from audits of all LFVs, including those that do not There are two important differences between the data provided by WIND and the Audit
Office. First, the data in the Audit Office covers all local financing vehicles, whereas the WIND database only includes local financing vehicles that issue bonds. Second, the data on the Audit Office only covers "official" debt of the LGVs, which the Audit Office defines as "the debt that government has responsibility to repay or the debt to which the government would fulfill the responsibility of guarantee or for bailout when the debtor encounters difficulty in repayment." (National Audit Office, 2011) "Official" debt is only a subset of total debt of the LFVs. This is because although LGVs were originally set up to finance local infrastructure projects, many of them have since ventured into commercial projects. In contrast, the debt in the WIND database covers all LGV debt, including the debt used to finance the LGV's commercial projects. The data provided by the Audit Office answers the question "how much LGV debt was used for local infrastructure projects?" While that is an important question, we also want to know how the fiscal stimulus changed the local government's control over the allocation of resources. To answer this question, we need to know debt accumulation by LFVs used for infrastructure and for the commercial projects of the LFVs. We have no data on the latter, but we can use the firm level records of LFV data in the WIND data to impute the total amount of LFV debt (official and commercial debt). Specifically, we assume that the true distribution of This information suggests that the liabilities of the LFVs were predominantly bank loans during the fiscal stimulus but have shifted away from bank loans since then.
Turning to the composition of the assets of the LFVs, the Audit Office also provides information on what official debt has been used for. This is presented in Table 2 . One should interpret these numbers with caution, as it is not clear how carefully this information was audited. With this caveat in mind, the numbers in the audit report indicate that about 60% of the off-balance sheet expenditures of local governments were spent on infrastructure (municipal construction and transportation infrastructure).
This information also allows us to provide one more check on whether the 4 trillion stimulus package was carried out. We do not know what the official debt raised in 2009 and 2010 was spent on, but we know the total amount of additional "official" off-balance sheet debt in these two years totaled 3.6 trillion Yuan. If we assume that share of the debt raised in 2009 and 2010 spent on each item is the same as given in Table 2 , then we can estimate the "official"
off-balance sheet expenditures of local governments during the fiscal stimulus in 2009 and 2010. This information is summarized in the fourth column in Table 1 . The comparison of spending categories in the National Audit office report and in the project documents of the fiscal stimulus is not perfect. For example, it is not clear how exactly expenditures for "postdisaster reconstruction" is classified by the Audit office. Nonetheless, when we add the onbalance and off-balance sheet expenditures, we get the consistent story that about 60% of the stimulus was spent on infrastructure projects (broadly defined). Table 3 provides more evidence that local governments use LFVs after 2010 to circumvent budget constraints. We exploit the cross-sectional variation across localities in the tightness of the official budget constraint and examine whether localities with tighter official budget constraints make more use of LFVs. In the pre-stimulus period when LFVs were heavily regulated, we expect to see no correlation between LFV's borrowing and local fiscal gap. In contrast, the relaxation of the constraints over off-balance sheet borrowing would lead to a positive correlation after 2009. Column 1 reports the benchmark fixed-effect regression between log total debt from LFVs in a locality and the local fiscal gap (measured as the official budget deficit as share of local GDP). In Column 2, we add an interaction term between the fiscal gap and a post-2009 dummy that equals one for years after 2009 and zero otherwise.
The interaction term is positive and highly significant. In other words, a faster debt growth of a LFV is associated with a widening of local fiscal gap only in the post-stimulus period. In
Columns (3) and (4), we add a set of controls including log GDP, log population and GDP growth, with little change in the results. The reason behind this discrepancy is that less than a year after the new rules were issued, the central government showed signs of backing off the crackdown on LFVs. Perhaps in response to the small decline in the investment rate in 2014 and more generally the slowdown in aggregate growth (see Figures 1 and 2 ), the State Council issued a new decree in
May 2015 (document 40) that reversed its attempts to crack down on LFV borrowing. In particular, the May 2015 decree urged financial institutions to continue to lend to LFVs.
We do not have yet had data on investment spending after 2014, but the NBS provides a monthly series on "fixed asset investment" that provides more recent information.
Furthermore, in 2015, the NBS released for the first time monthly data on "fixed asset investment" in infrastructure. The "fixed asset investment" series has two problems. First, it includes purchases of land and pre-existing structures, as well as expenditures on previously used machinery. Second, it is based on a survey of large investment projects, which may not be representative of all investment spending. The gross fixed capital formation series we use in Figures 1 and 4 fixes these two problems, but is only available at an annual frequency (and is only available until 2014 at the time of the writing of this paper). With this caveat in mind, infrastructure investment measured by "fixed asset investment" grew at an annual rate of 17.2% in 2015, which is higher than the rate of aggregate investment of 10%. In the first seven months in 2016, "fixed asset investment" in infrastructure grew at an annual rate of 19.6%, 2.4 times as high as the growth rate of aggregate "fixed asset investment".
In sum, although the central government made several attempts to curb the LFVs over the last five years, the most recent evidence suggests that the central government is once again resorting to the same methods they used in 2009 and 2010. We do not know what will happen in the future, but the next section turns to an assessment of the aggregate effects of the offbalance spending undertaken by local governments from the end of the fiscal stimulus in 2010 to 2016.
Aggregate Effects of Partial Financial Liberalization
We now turn to an assessment of the aggregate effects of the partial financial liberalization. A common argument is that the main effect of the off-balance sheet spending by local governments, primarily on infrastructure investment, is to crowd out investment by private firms. Huang, Pagano, and Panizza (2016) , for example, provide empirical evidence that the investment rate private industrial firms in localities with large increases in off-balance sheet spending is lower than the investment rate of similar firms in localities that accumulated less debt.
This could be true, but there are several pieces of evidence that challenges this view. Another way to see this is to look at the asset composition of China's banking system (primarily formal banks and trusts). Ideally, we would directly measure the share of loans to private firms and loans to LFVs in the total assets of the banking system. The published balance sheets of the Chinese banking system do not provide this information, but we can use our estimate of total loans from banks and trust to the LFVs to impute this number. Panel A of Figure 9 presents the share of loans from the banking system to LFVs as a share of total assets of the banking system, where total assets consist of reserve assets, government and central government bonds, and loans to non-financial institutions. (We provide more detail on how we estimate the asset composition of the financial system in the appendix). The "official government debt" series measures loans from the banking system to LFVs used for infrastructure projects ("official debt") while "debt of all LFVs" is our estimate of all the loans of the financial system to the LFV (not just for the LFV's official debt). This number uses our estimate of bank and trust loans to LFVs along with published data on total assets of the banking system. Not surprisingly, official LFV debt as a share of total assets increases after 2008. Furthermore, as one would expect from Figure 6 , total banking system loans to LFVs increased by even more, reflecting loans of the banking system to fund the LFVs' commercial activities.
Despite the increase in lending to LFVs, Panel B shows that debt of non-financial institutions (excluding LFVs) as share of total assets of financial institutions increased by 4
percentage points between 2008 and 2014. How can the banking system lend more (as a share of total assets) to LFVs and at the same time also lend more to non-financial institutions?
Panel C provides the answer. It shows that the banking system's holdings of central bank bonds fell by about 7 percentage points (as a share of total banking system assets) over the same time period. Moreover, the share of reserves and central government bonds drop by 4.5
percentage points. This is about 3.5 percentage points more than the increase in the debt of all
LFVs as a share of total assets. This fact suggests that increasing share of local government debt on the balance sheet of the banking system was more than offset by the declining share of central bank bonds, reserves and government bonds. Put differently, the investment that is crowded out by the spending of LFV are primarily the Central Bank's purchases of US Treasury bills, and loans to firms have increased as a share of the assets of the financial system.
Viewed from the lenses of the decline in China's current account surplus, the other side of the decline in central bank bond holdings in the banking system is that the rate at which the central bank has been sterilizing the banking system's purchases of central bank bonds on the money supply has declined since 2008.
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Finally, we can also directly measure the investment rate of private firms vs. state owned firms. We do not have this information for the aggregate economy, but we can measure this using the firm-level data from the Chinese industrial surveys. We plot this in Figure 10 .
Not surprisingly, the investment rate of state-owned firms exceeds that of private firms in the industrial sector, reflecting the well documented preferential access of state owned firms to credit. Here, the investment rate of private industrial firms declines from an average of 15% in Second, the model also helps us understand why the boost in aggregate investment driven by financial liberalization will necessarily reduce trade surplus.
The economy consists of a financial intermediary and two types of firms: "connected"
and "unconnected" firms. There is no heterogeneity within each type. All firms produce a homogenous good with following production technology: , where is output, ∈ , , with and representing the connected and unconnected firms. Here, we consider the capital a firm needs to borrow from the financial intermediary.
The representative connected firm can borrow from the financial intermediary at a regulated interest rate, denoted by ̅ , subject to a borrowing limit . In Song et al. (2011) ,
∞. For simplicity, we assume to be a policy parameter that is exogenous to the connected firm. There is also a market interest rate, denoted by , at which both connected and unconnected firms can borrow. We will maintain the following assumption throughout:
̅ . The first inequality guarantees that the connected firm will always borrow up to the limit at the regulated interest rate. The second inequality, on the other hand, rules out the possibility that the connected firm will borrow from the market. The representative unconnected firm can only borrow at the market interest rate, equal to the marginal product of capital: .
The financial intermediary can borrow from and lend to the world market at an exogenous interest rate of * . The financial intermediary also takes domestic savings at a regulated deposit rate. For simplicity, we let the regulated deposit rate equal * . Aggregate domestic deposits, denoted by , are assumed to be exogenous. The economy has trade surplus if the aggregate fund demand, denoted by , is smaller than the aggregate domestic savings:
.
Trade surplus shows up as foreign assets on the balance sheet of the financial intermediary. So, the above equation can be rewritten as the balance-sheet constraint:
, where denotes foreign assets.
debt between listed firms and NBS firms. The stimulus package, including the monetary expansionary policies, the four trillion Yuan investment plan and the associated financial deregulation, seems to favor listed firms in terms of debt financing.
The more interesting finding is that after scaling back a bit their debt revenue ratio in 2010-11, listed firms continued to expand their debt at a much faster rate relative to their revenue. In 2015, the debt revenue ratio reaches 1, more than doubling the ratio of NBS firms in 2014. The divergence of the debt revenue ratio between listed and NBS firms after 2011 is hard to explain by discrimination embedded in the stimulus package. Rather, we view it as evidence supporting our story that the financial deregulation opens up a new channel through which financial resources can be directed towards the connected firms.
We Another way to examine the efficiency of capital allocation is to directly measure the dispersion of the marginal product of capital across firms. We do not directly measure the marginal product, but with some assumptions, we can proxy the marginal product of capital by the average product of capital. With this assumption, the overall dispersion in the marginal product of capital can be measured by the dispersion in the average product of capital. Figure   12 plots the variance in the log average product of capital (value-added relative to the capital stock) across privately owned industrial firms from 1998 to 2012 (we do not have firm level data from 2008 to 2010). We normalize the average product of capital of each firm by the median average product in each four digit industry, and also trim the 1% outliers in each industry-year.
As can be seen, the dispersion in the average product of capital falls slightly from 1998 to 2007, but shows a sharp increase between 2011 and 2013. Remember that this is exactly when off-balance sheet spending by local governments took off and when we start to see a larger amount of LFV debt used to fund commercial activities. To be clear, the dispersion in the average product of capital can reflect forces other than differences in access to capital across firms. For example, adjustment costs or differences in markups across firms will also show up as differences across firms in the average product of capital (see, for example, Song and Wu, 2015) . However, there is no reason why these forces should change over time.
Growing misallocation of capital would lower aggregate TFP and output growth, and as Figure   2 shows, the growth rate of aggregate GDP did fall after 2008.
The forces behind the growth slowdown in China are clearly complex. The slowdown can be due to the effect of the anti-corruption campaign that began in 2013 or the effect of property and equity market bubbles that may have also had the effect of misallocating financial resources. With more work, it would be very interesting to parse out how much of the growth slowdown is driven by these forces, including the effect of spending by off-balance sheet companies by local governments, but this is not a task we undertake in this paper.
The model also rationalizes why the external adjustment in China since 2008 would necessarily be associated with an increase in the investment rate (as opposed to a decrease in the savings rate). As discussed earlier, the current account surplus (as a share of GDP) starts to decline after 2007. A widely held explanation for the reversal of the current account surplus is that the appreciation of the Yuan discourages savings. However, there is only a small decline in the savings rate, and the decline in the current account is entirely driven (in a proximate sense) by the increase in the investment rate. Our argument here is that a similar mechanism is a play, but in reverse. The four trillion Yuan plan and the financial deregulation generates an investment boom, which leads to the rebalancing of China's current account.
Finally, the toy model also predicts a rising market interest rate, which is in line with what has been happening in the post-2009 period. The market-based deposit rates (i.e., returns to wealth management products), interbank repo rates and returns to trust products are all increasing (see, e.g., Hachem and Song, 2016) . This is also consistent with the finding of increasing capital productivity for non-favored firms that have little access to credit at regulated interest rates.
In sum, the long run effect of the temporary fiscal stimulus appears to have been an increase in the investment rate, a decline in the current account surplus, and a decline in productivity driven by the increased misallocation of resources. Again, we remind the reader that, at least at the time we are writing this paper, GDP growth appears to have slowed compared to the 1990s and 2000.
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Conclusion
The central facts about China's economy since 2008 are the slowdown in aggregate growth, the increase in the investment rate, the decline in the external surplus, and the rise in off-balance sheet debt by local governments. We argue that all four facts can be understood as Note: Fiscal gap is (local fiscal expenditure -local fiscal revenue) / local GDP. Other controls include log GDP, log population and GDP growth. Standard errors are in parentheses. Observations are city-level LFVs (i.e., prefectureand county-level LFVs).
